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Abstract
We consider quantum key distribution in the device-independent scenario, i.e., where the
legitimate parties do not know (or trust) the exact specification of their apparatus. We show how
secure key distribution can be realized against the most general attacks by a quantum adversary
under the condition that measurements on different subsystems by the honest parties commute.
1 Introduction
The security of quantum key distribution is based on the laws of physics and does not rely on any
(unproven) assumption of computational hardness. It does, however, assume that the honest parties
can control their physical devices accurately and completely. If an implementation of quantum key
distribution does not meet this requirement, its security may be compromised. For example, the
BB84 quantum key-distribution protocol [BB84] becomes completely insecure if the source emits
several instead of single photons or if the measurement device measures only in one instead of two
different bases. Experimentally, several successful attacks making use of imperfections of the physical
devices have lately been implemented (see, e.g. [Mak09, XQHK10, LWW+10]).
The goal of device-independent quantum key distribution is to show the security of key distribu-
tion schemes, where the exact description of the particle source (in particular, the dimension of the
Hilbert space they act on) and the exact specification of the measurement apparatus are unknown.
The honest parties can only check properties of the input/output behaviour of their physical system
described by statistical tests.
Two approaches to achieve device-independent quantum key distribution have been investigated:
the first uses the validity of quantum mechanics with all its formalism, while the second bases
security only on the non-signalling principle, i.e., the fact that the parties cannot use their physical
apparatus to send messages (in particular, measurements on an entangled quantum state cannot be
used for message transmission). It can be shown that this later condition is strictly weaker and that
there exist examples of systems which are secure against quantum adversaries, but insecure (or only
partially secure) in a model built on the non-signalling principle only. The latter can therefore lead
to unnecessarily low key rates or even the impossibility to create a key in certain regimes.
Our contribution: We give a general security proof of device-independent quantum key dis-
tribution against the most general attacks by any adversary limited by quantum mechanics under
the sole condition that whenever the key distribution protocol prescribes measurements on separate
subsystems, then these measurements commute. This condition can, for instance, be enforced by iso-
lating the individual subsystems or by performing the measurements at space-like separated points.
Furthermore, it is understood that the legitimate parties have access to a source of randomness1
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1It is already sufficient to have a source producing a small number of random bits. As shown in [Col06, PAM+10],
this randomness can then be expanded using a device-independent randomness expansion protocol.
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and that none of the devices leaks information to the environment. Our proof method applies to a
generic class of entanglement-based quantum key-distribution protocols [Eke91]. In particular, we
show that a protocol similar to the one proposed originally by Ekert reaches an asymptotic key rate
of one secure bit per channel use in the noiseless limit even in the device-independent scenario with
commuting measurements.
The proof method we use is based on a criterion by Navascue´s, Pirionio and Ac´ın [NPA07], to
bound the information a (quantum) adversary can have about the legitimate parties’ measurement
results by a semi-definite program. Our main technical contribution is to show that when the honest
parties share several systems with commuting measurements, then this semi-definite program follows
a sort of product theorem (Theorem 4), i.e., an adversary cannot guess the outputs of several systems
any better than trying to guess each output individually. The resulting security proof works for any
alphabet size of the inputs and outputs to the system and does not use any Hilbert space formalism,
only convex optimization techniques.
Our security proof can also be applied in the non-device-independent scenario, i.e., where the
properties of the devices are (partially) known (or trusted), leading to a higher key rate.
Our technique also implies that privacy amplification, i.e., the random hashing usually performed
at the end of the protocol to turn a partially secure raw key into a fully secure key, can be replaced
by a deterministic function, the XOR.
Related work: The problem of device-independence has been introduced and studied by May-
ers and Yao [MY98], who showed security against an adversary limited to individual attacks in
the noiseless scenario. The same scenario but allowing for noise has been treated in [MMMO06].
A device-independent quantum key distribution scheme secure against collective attacks has been
given in [ABG+07]. If the devices are memoryless, this scheme can even be shown secure against
the most general attacks, using a plausible but unproven assumption, as shown in [McK10].
Device-independent key distribution against adversaries only limited by the non-signalling prin-
ciple has first been studied by Barrett, Hardy and Kent [BHK05]. Key distribution schemes secure
against (non-signalling) individual attacks have been proposed and analysed in [AGM06, AMP06,
SGB+06]. Under the additional assumption that a non-signalling condition holds between all sub-
systems, security against the most general attacks has been proven in [Mas09, HRW10, MRW+09].
Outline: We will first introduce the mathematical framework needed to describe key distribu-
tion protocols and define their security (Section 2). In Section 3 we review the semi-definite criterion
by Navascue´s, Pironio and Ac´ın [NPA07] to bound the set of quantum systems. In Section 4 we
study how to bound the security of a single system. Our main technical result relates the security
of a single system to the security of many systems and is given in Section 5. Using these results,
we can then give a general security proof for device-independent quantum key distribution. We first
treat the case when the marginal systems shared by the honest parties are independent (Section 6),
before removing this requirement in Section 7. Finally in Section 8, we apply our result to a specific
protocol which is secure in the device-independent scenario.
2 Framework
2.1 Systems
We define security in the context of random systems [Mau02]. A system is an abstract device
taking inputs and giving outputs at one or more interfaces and is characterized by the probability
distributions of the outputs given the inputs. The closeness of two systems S0 and S1 can be
measured by introducing a so-called distinguisher. A distinguisher D is itself a system which cna
interact with another system and output a bit, B. Assume the distinguisher is connected at random
either to system S0 or to S1; after interacting with the system, the distinguisher is supposed to guess
which of the two systems it is connected to. The distinguishing advantage between system S0 and
S1 is then defined in terms of the probability of winning this game.
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Definition 1. The distinguishing advantage between two systems S0 and S1 is
δ(S0,S1) = max
D
[P (B = 1|S = S1)− P (B = 1|S = S0)] ,
where the maximum ranges over all distinguishers D connected to a system S and where B denotes
the output of the distinguisher. Two systems S0 and S1 are called ǫ-indistinguishable if δ(S0,S1) ≤ ǫ.
The probability of any event E , defined in a scenario involving a system S0 cannot differ by more
than this quantity from the probability of a corresponding event in a scenario where S0 has been
replaced by S1. The reason is that otherwise this event could be used to distinguish the two systems.
Lemma 1. Let S0 and S1 be ǫ-indistinguishable systems. Denote by P (E|S0) the probability of
an event E, defined by any of the input and output variables of the system S0. Then P (E|S0) ≤
P (E|S1) + ǫ.
The distinguishing advantage is a pseudo-metric, in particular, it fulfils the triangle inequality
δ(S0,S1) + δ(S1,S2) ≥ δ(S0,S2) . (1)
2.2 Modelling key agreement
The security of a cryptographic primitive can be measured by its distance from an ideal system which
is secure by definition. For example in the case of key distribution, the ideal system is a perfect
key generation system which outputs a uniform and random key (bit string) S to both legitimate
parties (usually called Alice and Bob) but does not leak any information about S to the adversary
(called Eve). This key is secure by construction. A real key generation system is called secure if it
is indistinguishable from this ideal one.
Definition 2. A perfect ℓ-bit key generation system is a system which outputs two equal uni-
form random variables SA and SB with range S of size |S| = 2ℓ at two designated interfaces (i.e.,
PSASB (sA, sB) = 1/|S| if sA = sB and 0 otherwise) and for which all other interfaces are uncorrelated
with SA and SB.
Definition 3. A key generation system is ǫ-secure if the system is ǫ-indistinguishable from a perfect
key generation system.
As a consequence of Lemma 1, the resulting security is composable [PW01], [BPW03], [Can01].
That is, no matter in what application the key is used, it is as useful as a perfect key, except with
a small probability ǫ.
The real key generation system we are interested in is one obtained by running a protocol (π, π′)
using as underlying resource a public authenticated channel and a pre-distributed quantum state
(see Figure 1). More precisely, Alice and Bob both execute locally a program, π and π′, to generate
keys, SA and SB, respectively. Furthermore, we model the adversary, Eve, as a program that has
access to additional interfaces of these resources. The interface to the public channel provides her
with the entire public communication, Q. Furthermore, she can choose an arbitrary measurement,
W , to be applied to the pre-distributed quantum state, resulting in an outcome Z.
Note that, in a realistic scenario, an adversary may access the channel interactively, make mea-
surements and, depending on the outcomes, decide on further actions. This is, however, captured
by our model, as the single input W may be interpreted as the encoding of an entire strategy that
specifies how a real system would be accessed. More precisely, Eve obtains all the communication
exchanged over the public channel Q, can then choose a measurement W (which can depend on Q)
and finally obtains an outcome Z.
In order to derive bounds on the parameter ǫ in Definition 3, we split this parameter in two parts,
where one corresponds to the correctness (the probability that Alice’s and Bob’s key are different,
i.e., P (SA 6= SB)) and the other one corresponds to the secrecy. The latter is quantified by the
distance from uniform of the key SA given the information accessible to Eve, i.e., Z(Wq) and Q
(we write Z(Wq) because the eavesdropper can choose the input adaptively and the choice of input
changes the output distribution).
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Figure 1: Our real key distribution system Sreal (left). Alice and Bob share a public authentic
channel and a quantum state. When they apply a protocol π to obtain a key, all this can together
be modelled as a system. In our ideal system Sideal (right), instead of outputting the key generated
by the protocol (π, π′), the system outputs a uniform random string S to both Alice and Bob. We
will also sometimes use an intermediate system Sint which is the same as the real system but with
SB replaced by SA.
Definition 4. For a given system as depicted in Figure 1, the distance from uniform of SA given
Z(Wq) and Q is
d(SA|Z(Wq), Q) = 1/2 ·
∑
s,q
max
w
∑
z
PZ,Q|W=w(z, q) · |PSA|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(s)− PU (s)| ,
where PU is the uniform distribution over |S|, i.e., PU (s) = 1/|S|.
The distance from uniform can be seen as the distinguishing advantage between the real system
and an intermediate system, Sint, which is equal to our real system, but which outputs SA on both
sides (i.e., SB is replaced by SA).
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the definitions of the systems in Figure 1 and
the distinguishing advantage.
Lemma 2. Consider the intermediate system Sint and the ideal system as defined above (see Fig-
ure 1). Then
δ(Sint,Sideal) = d(SA|Z(Wq), Q) .
The correctness of the protocol, i.e., the probability that Alice’s and Bob’s key are equal, is
determined by the distinguishing advantage from the intermediate system to the real system, more
precisely, the probability that the real system outputs different values on the two sides. This is again
a direct consequence of the definitions.
Lemma 3. Consider the intermediate system Sint and the real system Sreal as defined above. Then
δ(Sreal,Sint) =
∑
sA 6=sB
PSASB (sA, sB) .
Finally, by the triangle inequality (1) on the distinguishing advantage of systems, we obtain
the following lemma relating the security of our protocol to the secrecy (measured in terms of the
distance from uniform) and the correctness.
Lemma 4. The key generation system depicted in Figure 1 is ǫ-secure if
ǫ ≤ d(SA|Z(Wq), Q) +
∑
sA 6=sB
PSASB (sA, sB) .
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2.3 Quantum systems
The fact that in the above scenario (see Figure 1), the random variables U, V,W,X, Y, Z correspond
to the choice of measurements on a quantum state and their respective outcomes imposes a limitation
on their possible distribution and, with this, on the eavesdropper’s attacks. Consider the scenario
where Alice, Bob and Eve share a tripartite quantum state. They can each measure their part of
the system and obtain a measurement outcome. We can, of course, also consider the system Alice
and Bob share tracing out Eve and this still corresponds to a quantum state (the reduced state). In
accordance with the non-signalling principle, the marginal state Alice and Bob share is independent
of what Eve does with her part of the state (in particular, independent of her measurement). And
we can even consider the state Alice and Bob share conditioned an a certain measurement outcome
of Eve: Alice and Bob still share a quantum state in this case.
Definition 5. An n-party system PX|U , where X = (X1 . . . Xn), is called quantum if there exists
a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ H =⊗iHi and a set of measurement operators {Exiui} on Hi such that
PX|U (x,u) = 〈ψ|
⊗
i
Exiui |ψ〉 ,
where the measurement operators satisfy the following conditions
1. Hermitian, i.e., Exiui
† = Exiui for all xi, ui,
2. orthogonal projectors, i.e., ExiuiE
x′i
ui = E
xi
ui δxix′i ,
3. and sum up to the identity, i.e.,
∑
xi
Exiui = 1Hi for all ui.
Note that the requirement that the operators correspond to projectors and the state to a pure
state is not a restriction, since any POVM on a mixed state is equivalent to a projective measurement
on a larger pure state (see, e.g., [NC00] for a proof).
For any (n+ 1)-party quantum system, the marginal and conditional systems are also quantum
systems.
Lemma 5. Consider an (n + 1)-party quantum system PXZ|UW . Then the marginal system
PX|U (x,u) :=
∑
z
PXZ|UW (x, z,u, w)
and the conditional system
PX|U ,W=w,Z=z(x,u) :=
1
PZ|W=w(z)
PXZ|UW (x, z,u, w)
are n-party quantum systems.
This follows, of course, directly from the properties of quantum systems. However, as an illus-
tration, we give a direct proof in our framework.
Proof. Let |ψ〉 be the state and {Exiui} the measurement operators associated with the original
system. For the marginal system, take the same state |ψ〉 and the measurement operators {Exiui} for
all i < n. The measurement operator associated with the nth party are {Exnun ⊗ 1Hn+1}. They fulfil
the requirements because they are part of the requirements of the operators of the (n + 1)-party
quantum system. For the conditional system take the state 1√
〈ψ|1H1...n⊗E
z
w|ψ〉
1H1...n ⊗Ezw |ψ〉, where
1H1...n =
⊗n
i=1 1Hi and the measurement operators {Exiui}.
Lemma 5 directly implies that any measurement of Eve on her part of the system induces a
convex decomposition of Alice’s and Bob’s system into several conditional quantum systems.
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Remark 1. Every input to an (n + 1)-party quantum system, PXZ|UW , corresponds to a decompo-
sition of the marginal n-party system PX|U such that
PX|U =
∑
z
pz · P z
X|U ,
where pz := PZ|W=w(z) is a probability and P
z
X|U := PX|U ,W=w,Z=z is a quantum system.
3 Bounding the Set of Quantum Systems by Semi-Definite Pro-
gramming
In [NPA07], Navascue´s, Pironio and Ac´ın give a criterion in terms of a semi-definite program (see,
e.g. [BV04, BTN01] for an introduction to semi-definite programming) which any quantum system
must fulfil (see also [NPA08, DLTW08]). The idea is that if a system is quantum, then it is possible
to associate a matrix Γ with it which needs to be positive semi-definite. We will use the notation
Γ  0 to denote positive semi-definite matrices. Γ can be seen as the matrix defined as follows.
Definition 6. A sequence of length k of a set {Exiui : xi ∈ Xi, ui ∈ Ui, i ∈ 1, . . . , n} is a product of k
operators of this set. The sequence of length 0 is defined as the identity operator.
Definition 7. The matrix Γk is defined as
Γkij := 〈Ψ|O†iOj|Ψ〉 ,
where Oi = E
xm
um · E
x′n
u′n
· · · is a sequence of length at most k of the measurement operators {Exiui}.
In the above notation we consider the measurement operators as operators on the whole Hilbert
space H. These operators must, of course, fulfil the conditions of Definition 5 (i.e., they must be
Hermitian orthogonal projectors and sum up to the identity for each input) and they must commute.
Note that in finite dimensions, commutativity is equivalent to the tensor product structure as in
Definition 5 (see, e.g., [Weh08] for an explicit proof of this).
The requirements the measurement operators fulfil (Definition 5) translate into requirements on
the entries of the matrix Γk. For example, certain entries must be equal to others or the sum of
some must be equal to the sum of others.
In order to decide whether a certain system is quantum, we can ask the question whether such a
matrix Γk exists; because if it is, it must be possible to associate a matrix Γ (as in Definition 7) with
it, which is consistent with the probabilities describing the system and fulfil the above requirements.
The problem of finding a consistent matrix Γk is a semi-definite programming problem.
Theorem 1 (Navascue´s, Pironio, Ac´ın [NPA07]). For every quantum system PX|U and k ∈ N there
exists a symmetric matrix Γk with Γkij = 〈Ψ|O†iOj |Ψ〉 and where Oi = Exmum ·E
x′n
u′n
· · · is a sequence of
length k. Furthermore,
Aqb · Γk = 0 and
Γk  0 ,
where Aqb is defined by the conditions
• orthogonal projectors: 〈Ψ|OExiuiE
x′i
uiO
′|Ψ〉 − 〈Ψ|OExiui δxix′iO′|Ψ〉 = 0
• completeness:
∑
xi
〈Ψ|OExiuiO′|Ψ〉 − 〈Ψ|OO′|Ψ〉 = 0 for all ui
• commutativity: 〈Ψ|OExiuiE
xj
ujO
′|Ψ〉 = 〈Ψ|OExjujExiuiO′|Ψ〉 for i 6= j,
where O and O′ stand for arbitrary operator sequences of the set {Exiui}.
Γk is called quantum certificate of order k associated with the system PX|U .
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Proof. Orthogonality, completeness and Hermiticity follow directly from Definition 5. Let us see
that the matrix is positive semi-definite. For all v ∈ Cm
vTΓkv =
∑
ij
vTi Γ
k
ijvi =
∑
ij
v∗i 〈Ψ|O†iOj |Ψ〉 vj = 〈Ψ|V †V |Ψ〉 ≥ 0
where V :=
∑
i viOi. Finally, the matrix can be taken to be real, because for any complex Γ
k, the
matrix (Γk + Γk
∗
)/2 is real and fulfils the conditions.
We do not require this matrix to be normalized. Note that the matrix Γk contains, in particu-
lar, the (potentially not normalized) probabilities PX|U (x,u) associated with an n-party quantum
system, for n ≤ 2k.
In [NPA08, DLTW08], it is shown that if for all k →∞ a certificate of order k can be associated
with a certain system PX|U , then this system is indeed quantum. More precisely, it corresponds to a
quantum system where operators associated with different parties commute, but do not necessarily
have a tensor product structure. For any finite dimensional system however, commutativity implies
a tensor product structure. See, e.g., [DLTW08] for an explicit proof of this.
4 Min-Entropy Bound for Single Systems
It will be our goal to show the security of a key-distribution protocol of the form as given in Figure 1.
The crucial part hereby is to bound the probability that an eavesdropper interacting with her part
of the quantum state can correctly guess the value of Alice’s raw key X, since this corresponds to
the min-entropy, by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Ko¨nig, Renner, Schaffner [KRS09]). Let ρXE be classical on HX . Then
Hmin(X|E)ρ = − log2 Pguess(X|E)ρ ,
where pguess(X|E)ρ is the maximal probability of decoding X from E with a POVM {ExE}x on HE,
i.e.,
Pguess(X|E)ρ := max
{ExE}x
∑
x
px tr(E
x
Eρ
x
B) .
This implies that, in order to bound the min-entropy, we can equivalently bound the guessing
probability. Once the min-entropy is bounded, a secure key can be obtained using standard tech-
niques, such as information reconciliation [BS93] and privacy amplification, which work even if the
adversary holds quantum information [RK05, Ren05].
In this section, we will see how it is possible to determine the security of a single system (corre-
sponding to a single measurement of Alice and Bob) by a semi-definite program. In Section 5, we
will see that the security of many systems, and therefore of the key distribution scheme, directly
relates to the security of the single system.
In the following, we will often consider a (2n + 1)-party quantum system PXY Z|UVW (as well
as its marginals) where U = (U1 . . . Un) and X = (X1 . . . Xn) are Alice’s inputs and outputs,
V = (V1 . . . Vn) and Y = (Y1 . . . Yn) are Bob’s inputs and outputs, and W and Z Eve’s input and
output. The fact that Eve only has a single input and output reflects the fact that Eve may perform
a joint attack, which means that she would not necessarily measure her subsystems individually.
4.1 A bound on the min-entropy
We will, in the following, study the scenario where Eve can choose an input W , depending on some
additional information Q, and then obtains an output Z (depending on W ). She should then try to
guess a value f(X) of range F . In particular, this function f can, of course, be the identity function
on the outputs on Alice’s side.
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Definition 8. The guessing probability of f(X) given Z(W ) is
Pguess(f(X)|Z(W ), Q) =
∑
q
max
w
∑
z
PZQ|W=w(z, q) ·max
f(x)
Pf(X)|Z=z,Q=q,W=w(f(x)) ,
where the maximization is over all w such that PXZ|UW is a quantum system. The min-entropy of
f(X) given Z(W ) is
Hmin(f(X)|Z(W ), Q)) = − log2 Pguess(f(X)|Z(W ), Q)) .
Remark 1 gives a bound on the probability that a quantum adversary can guess Alice’s outcome
by the following maximization problem. (We assume that the inputs u are public, i.e., Q = (U =
u, F = f))
Lemma 6. The value of Pguess(f(X)|Z(W ), Q) where PXZ|UW is a (n+ 1)-party quantum system
and Q = (U = u) is bounded by the optimal value of the following optimization problem
max :
|F|∑
z=1
pz
∑
x:f(x)=z
P z
X|U (x,u)
s. t. : PX|U =
|F|∑
z=1
pz · P z
X|U
P z
X|U n-party quantum system, for all z .
Proof. The first condition follows by the definition of the marginal system and the second by the fact
that for any (n + 1)-party quantum system the conditional systems are n-party quantum systems
(see Lemma 5). The objective function is the definition of guessing probability. It is sufficient to
consider the case |Z| = |F| because any system where Z has larger range can be made into a system
reaching the same guessing probability by combining the system where the same value f(X) has
maximal probability. By the convexity of quantum systems, this is still a quantum system.
The criterion discussed in Section 3 allows to replace the condition that P z
XY |UV is a quantum
behaviour by the condition that a certain matrix is positive semi-definite. We can now bound Eve’s
guessing probability by a semi-definite program. A similar bound has been obtained in [PAM+10]
in the context of device-independent randomness expansion.
Lemma 7. The maximum guessing probability of f(X) given Z(W ) and Q := (U = u, F = f) is
bounded by2
Pguess(f(X)|Z(W ), Q) ≤
|F|∑
z=1
bTz · Γz ,
where
∑|F|
z=1 b
T
z · Γz is the optimal value of the semi-definite program
max :
|F|∑
z=1
∑
x:f(x)=z
Γz(x,u) (2)
s. t. : Aqb · Γz = 0 for all z
Γz  0∑
z
Γz = Γkmarg
2In the following, we sometimes write matrices as vectors by writing each column ‘on top of each other’. When we
write that a vector needs to be positive semi-definite, we mean that the matrix obtained by the inverse transformation
must be positive semi-definite.
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where Γz(x,u) denotes the entry of the matrix Γz corresponding to 〈Ψ|∏iExiuiEzw|Ψ〉, i.e., the prob-
ability P z
X|U (x,u); bz is a matrix of the same size as Γ
z and it has a 1 at the positions where Γk
has the entry 〈ψ|O†iOi|ψ〉, where Oi =
∏
mE
xm
um such that f(x) = z. Γ
k
marg denotes the certificate of
order k associated with the marginal system PX|U .
Proof. This follows from Lemma 6, the fact that any quantum system P z
X|U has a quantum certificate
of order k and
∑
z E
z
w = 1.
The primal and dual program can be expressed as:
PRIMAL
max :
∑|F|
z=1 b
T
z · Γz (3)
s. t. :


Aqb · · · 0
. . .
0 · · · Aqb
1 · · · 1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
·

 Γ1...
Γ|F|

 =


0
...
0
Γkmarg


︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
Γi  0 for all i
DUAL
min : Γkmarg
T · λ|F|+1 (4)
s. t. :


ATqb · · · 0 1
. . .
0 · · · ATqb 1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
AT
·


λ1
...
λ|F|
λ|F|+1

 

 b1...
b|F|


︸ ︷︷ ︸
b
λi unrestricted
We note that any dual feasible solution gives an upper bound on the guessing probability (linear)
in terms of the matrix Γmarg associated with the marginal system of Alice and Bob. Furthermore,
the dual feasible region is independent of Alice’s and Bob’s marginal system, it only depends on the
number of inputs and outputs and the step in the semi-definite hierarchy considered.
However, the matrix Γkmarg contains entries which do not correspond to observable probabilities
and are only known if the state and measurement operators are known. It will be the goal of the
next section to express the guessing probability in terms of observable quantities.
4.2 A min-entropy bound in terms of observable probabilities
Certain entries of the matrix Γkmarg do not correspond to observable probabilities and it is, therefore,
impossible to know their value by testing the system. In this section, we will modify the above
optimization problem in such a way as to get a solution only in terms of observable probabilities.
More precisely, we will modify the optimization problem to take the ‘worst’ possible quantum cer-
tificate consistent with observed probabilities. This leads to the following, modified, semi-definite
program. The matrix AIJ is defined such that multiplied with a quantum certificate the observable
probabilities are obtained, i.e., AIJ ·Γk = PX|U (where PX|U denotes here the vector containing the
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values PX|U (x,u) for all x,u).
PRIMAL
max :
∑|F|
z=1 b
T
z · Γz (5)
s. t. :


Aqb · · · 0 0
. . . 0
0 · · · Aqb 0
1 · · · 1 −1
0 · · · 0 AIJ

 ·


Γ1
...
Γ|F|
Γkmarg

 =


0
...
0
0
PX|U


Γi  0, Γkmarg unrestricted
DUAL
min : P T
X|U · λ|F|+2 (6)
s. t. :


ATqb · · · 0 1 0
. . . 0
0 · · · ATqb 1 0
0 · · · 0 −1 ATIJ

 ·


λ1
...
λ|F|
λ|F|+1
λ|F|+2



=


b1
...
b|F|
0


λi unrestricted
Note that we have changed Γkmarg to be a variable (instead of a constant). Obviously Γ
k
marg  0
holds because it is the sum of positive semi-definite matrices.
Lemma 8. If λ1, . . . , λ|F|+2 are dual feasible for (6), then λ1, . . . , λ|F|+1 are dual feasible for (4)
with the same objective value.
Proof. We use the fact that AIJ · Γkmarg = PX|U . Since λ1, . . . , λ|F|+2 are dual feasible for (6), it
holds that ATIJ · λ|F|+2 = λ|F|+1. Therefore,
Γkmarg
T · λ|F|+1 = Γkmarg
T · ATIJ · λ|F|+2 = P TX|U · λ|F|+2 .
Lemma 8 implies that any dual feasible solution of (6) gives an upper bound on the guessing
probability linear in terms of the observable probabilities. In terms of the min-entropy we obtain
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For any dual feasible λ,
Hmin(X|Z(W )) ≤ − log2(P TX|U · λ|F|+2) .
Example 1. Consider a bipartite quantum system with binary inputs and outputs given by the
mixture of the system in Figure 2 with weight 1 − ρ and a perfectly random bit with weight ρ
(this could be achieved by measuring a mixture of a singlet and a fully mixed state, i.e., the state
(1 − ρ) · |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−| + ρ · 141 using the measurements U0, U1, V0, V1 given in Figure 4). The guessing
probability of the output bit X as function of the parameter ρ is given in Figure 3.3
3The data plotted in Figure 3 has been obtained by solving (5) numerically, using the programs MATLAB®, Yalmip
and Sedumi [MAT08, Stu98, Lo¨f04].
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Figure 2: The probabilities associated with a
quantum system obtained by measuring the
singlet state using the bases U0, U1, V0, V1 of
Figure 4.
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Figure 3: The bound on the guessing proba-
bility of the measurement outcomes of Exam-
ple 1.
5 Min-Entropy Bound for Multiple Systems
We can now show our main technical result, namely that the above semi-definite program describing
the guessing probability has a product form if the measurements on different subsystems commute.
Roughly, we will show the following: consider a system PXY |UV associated with a single pair of
systems and the matrix Γk associated with the kth step of the hierarchy , fulfilling Aqb · Γk = 0.
Then with two pairs of systems it is possible to associate a matrix Γ′k living in the tensor product
space of two Γk. Furthermore, this matrix must fulfil (1⊗Aqb)Γ′k = 0.
5.1 Conditions on several quantum systems
The goal of this section is to express the constraints that hold for a multi-party quantum system in
terms of the constraints on its subsystems.
Definition 9. Assume an (n+m)-party quantum system. The reduced quantum certificate of order
k is the matrix Γ′kn+m, defined as
(Γ′
k
n+m)ij = 〈Ψ|O†i1O
†
i2
Oj2Oj1 |Ψ〉 ,
where i = l · (i1 − 1) + i2, j = l · (j1 − 1) + j2 and l is the number of rows of a quantum certificate
of order k for the n-party quantum system. Oi1 is the operator associated with the i
th row of the
quantum certificate of order k of the marginal n-party system (and similar for Oi2 and the m-party
system).
Lemma 9. Γ′kn+m  0
Proof. This follows directly form the fact that Γ′kn+m is a sub-matrix of the (2k)
th order quantum
certificate associated with the (n+m)-party quantum system.
The main insight, which will lead directly to the product theorems, is the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let PX1|U1 be an n-party and PX2|U2 an m-party quantum system. Call the associated
certificates of order k Γk1 and Γ
k
2 and write the linear conditions they fulfil as Aqb,1 · Γk1 = 0, and
Aqb,2 · Γk2 = 0. Then the reduced quantum certificate of order k associated with the (n +m)-party
quantum system, fulfils
(Aqb,1 ⊗ 1Γk2 ) · Γ
′k
n+m = 0 and (1Γk1
⊗Aqb,2) · Γ′kn+m = 0 .
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This can be interpreted the following way: even conditioned on any specific outcome of the
second system, the first system must still be a quantum system.
Proof. The matrix Aqb,1 contains entries of the form 〈Ψ|Oi1Oj1 |Ψ〉 − 〈Ψ|Oi′1Oj′1 |Ψ〉 = 0 which all
operators associated with an n-party quantum system must fulfil, because Oi1Oj1 −Oi′1Oj′1 = 0. By
the definition of Γ′kn+m, (Aqb,1 ⊗ 1Γk2 ) · Γ
′k
n+m contains conditions of the form
〈Ψ|Oi1Oi2Oj2Oj1 |Ψ〉 − 〈Ψ|Oi′1Oi2Oj2Oj′1 |Ψ〉
= 〈Ψ|Oi1Oj1Oi2Oj2 |Ψ〉 − 〈Ψ|Oi′1Oj′1Oi2Oj2 |Ψ〉
= 〈Ψ| (Oi1Oj1 −Oi′1Oj′1)Oi2Oj2 |Ψ〉 = 0
where we have used the fact that operators associated with different parties commute, linearity, and
the fact that the operators associated with an (n +m)-party quantum system must still fulfil the
conditions associated with a single system (as stated in Definition 5).
5.2 A product lemma for the guessing probability
Using this property, we can show the product lemma (Theorem 4) for the guessing probability (for
more details we refer to [Ha¨n10]).
Lemma 11. Consider the semi-definite program (3) defined by A1, b1, c1, bounding the guessing
probability of f(X1) of an n-party quantum system PX1|U1, where Q1 = (U1 = u1, F = f). And
similarly, associate A2, b2, c2 with an m-party quantum system PX2|U2 , where g(X2) and Q2 =
(U2 = u2, G = g). Then the guessing probability of f(X1) ‖ g(X2) (denoting the concatenation)
of the (n + m)-party system PX1X2|U1U2 where Q = (U = u, F = f,G = g) is bounded by the
semi-definite program A, b, c with b = b1 ⊗ b2, A = A1 ⊗A2.
Proof. This follows form the fact that any (n+m)-party quantum system must fulfil Lemma 10 and
that bi⊗ bj has a 1 exactly at the entry associated with 〈ψ|O†1O†2O2O1|ψ〉, where O1 is the operator
associated with the probability of the outcome x1 mapped to a certain f(x1), and similarly for O2
and g(x2).
Consider now the dual of this ‘tensor product’ problem. We will use a product theorem from [MS07]
(see also [LM08]) to show that for any dual feasible λ (for a single system), λ⊗· · ·⊗λ is dual feasible
for the dual of the tensor product problem, therefore, forming an upper bound on the guessing
probability.
Theorem 3 (Mittal, Szegedy [MS07]). Consider the semi-definite program min : cT1 ·λ1, s. t. : AT1 λ1−
b1  0 and a feasible λ1, and similarly for AT2 , b2, c2, λ2. Assume b1  0 and b2  0. Then λ = λ1⊗λ2
is feasible for the semi-definite program min : (c1 ⊗ c2)T · λ, s. t. : (A1 ⊗A2)Tλ− (b1 ⊗ b2)  0.
Proof. We use the fact that for a λ such that ATλ− b  0, where b  0, it holds that ATλ− b+2b =
ATλ + b  0 because we consider a convex cone. The tensor product of two positive semi-definite
matrices is positive semi-definite. We obtain
(AT1 λ1 − b1)⊗ (AT2 λ2 + b2) = AT1 λ1 ⊗AT2 λ2 − b1 ⊗AT2 λ2 +AT1 λ1 ⊗ b2 − b1 ⊗ b2  0
(AT1 λ1 + b1)⊗ (AT2 λ2 − b2) = AT1 λ1 ⊗AT2 λ2 + b1 ⊗AT2 λ2 −AT1 λ1 ⊗ b2 − b1 ⊗ b2  0 .
Adding the two inequalities and dividing by two, implies that
AT1 λ1 ⊗AT2 λ2 − b1 ⊗ b2 = (AT1 ⊗AT2 )(λ1 ⊗ λ2)− b1 ⊗ b2  0 ,
which means that λ1 ⊗ λ2 is feasible for the product problem.
Lemma 12. Let λ1 be a dual feasible solution (4) defined by A1, b1, c1 (see Lemma 11), and similarly
for λ2 and A2, b2, c2. Then λ = λ1⊗λ2 is dual feasible for A, b, c where A = A1⊗A2 and b = b1⊗ b2.
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Proof. Note that bi is of the form 

0 · · · 0
0 1 0 · · · 0
· · ·
0 · · · 0

 ,
i.e., it has a 1 in the place where the matrix Γ has the entry 〈Ψ|Exu†Exu |Ψ〉 for f(x) = i and 0
everywhere else. It, therefore, only has positive entries on the diagonal and 0 everywhere else.
Clearly, bi  0. The claim then follows by Theorem 3.
We can now formulate the product lemma for the guessing probability.
Theorem 4 (Product lemma for the guessing probability). Let PX1|U1 be an n-party quantum
system and f(X1) a function f : X1 → F such that Pguess(f(X1)|Z(W ), Q) ≤ P TX1|U1 · λ1, where
Q = (U1 = u1, F = f). Similarly, associate the guessing probability Pguess(g(X2)|Z(W,Q) ≤
P T
X2|U2
· λ2 with an m-party quantum system PX2|U2 where Q = (U2 = u2, G = g). Then the
guessing probability of f(X1)||g(X2) obtained from the (n +m)-party quantum system PX1X2|U1U2
with Q = (U1 = u1,U2 = u2, F = f,G = g) is bounded by
Pguess(f(X1)||g(X2)|Z(W ), Q) ≤ P TX1X2|U1U2 · (λ1 ⊗ λ2) .
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 12.
When the marginal system is of the form PX1|U1 ⊗PX2|U2 , this implies that the guessing proba-
bility is the product of the guessing probabilities of the two subsystems. In terms of the min-entropy,
it implies that the min-entropy is additive.
Corollary 2. Let PX|U =
⊗
n PX|U . Then
Hmin(X|Z(W )) = n ·Hmin(X|Z(W ))
6 Security under an Independence Assumption
We have, in the previous sections, established all tools required for proving the security of quantum
key distribution. The proof will consist of two steps. In the first, we will show that, using the above
lemmas, we can have secure key distribution if the marginal distribution as seen by Alice and Bob
looks like the product of several (identical) independent systems. In the next section, we will remove
the condition of independence, because knowing that we are in a permutation invariant scenario,
we will be able to relate the security of an arbitrary distribution to the security of independent
distributions.
Roughly speaking, an entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol proceeds along
the following steps (we assume here, that Alice and Bob start with pre-distributed particle pairs
described by a system P⊗nXY |UV .
• Parameter estimation: Alice and Bob obtain a system P⊗nXY |UV . In order to be able to bound
Eve’s knowledge about the raw key, they need to estimate the probability distribution PXY |UV
of the individual systems.
• Information reconciliation: Alice sends some information about her raw key to Bob, such that
he can correct the errors in his raw key.
• Privacy Amplification: Alice and Bob apply a public hash function to their raw keys in order
to create a highly secure key.
In the following we describe each of these steps in more detail and prove the technical results
that will then constitute our security proof.
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6.1 Parameter estimation
Alice and Bob perform statistical tests on their system P⊗nXY |UV in order to estimate the probability
distribution PXY |UV of the individual systems. They abort, if this distribution deviates from the
desired one.
The parameter-estimation protocol makes sure that only systems are accepted which have enough
min-entropy, such that the final key will be secure.
Definition 10. A parameter estimation protocol is said to ǫ-securely filter systems PXY |UV of a
set P if on input PXY |UV ∈ P the protocol outputs ‘abort’ with probability at least 1− ǫ. It is said
to be ǫ′-robust on systems PXY |UV of a set P if on input PXY |UV ∈ P the protocol outputs ‘abort’
with probability at most ǫ′.
Protocol 1 (Parameter estimation).
1. Alice and Bob receive a system PXY |UV = P
⊗n
XY |UV .
2. Alice chooses u such that for each i with probability 1− k, ui = u¯i, where u¯ denotes the input
on which a raw key bit is generated. With probability k, she chooses ui uniformly at random
amongst U .
3. Bob chooses v such that vi = v¯i with probability 1 − k and with probability k, vi is chosen
uniformly at random.
4. They input u and v into the system and obtain the outputs x and y.
5. They exchange the inputs over the public authenticated channel.
6. If less than (1− k)2pn inputs were (u¯, v¯), they abort.
7. Call t the number of inputs where both chose not u¯ and v¯. If any combination u, v occurred
less than k2pn/|U||V| times they abort.
8. From the inputs where they both chose a uniform input they estimate the distribution by
P estXY UV (x, y, u, v) =
1
t |{i|(xi, yi, ui, vi) = (x, y, u, v)}|. Define P as the set of all PXY UV such
that |U||V| · P TXY UV · λ ≤ Pguess for some dual feasible λ (see (4)) and P (X 6= Y |U = u¯, V =
v¯) ≤ δ. If d(P estXY UV , PPXY UV ) > η Alice and Bob abort, else, they accept.
We are now introducing some definitions which are used for the analysis of this protocol.
Definition 11. Let P be a set of distributions PXY UV . The set of systems Pη are all distributions
which have distance at least η with the set P, i.e.,
Pη = {PXY UV |d(PXY UV , PPXY UV ) > η for all PPXY UV ∈ P}
Definition 12. Let P be a set of distributions PXY UV . The set of systems P−η are all distributions
which have distance at least η with the complement of the set P, i.e.,
P−η = {PXY UV |d(PXY UV , P P¯XY UV ) > η for all P P¯XY UV /∈ P}
We further define the set of conditional systems which are η-far or η-close to a certain set by the
closeness of the distributions which can be obtained from them by choosing the input distribution
to be uniform.
Definition 13. Let Pcond be a set of systems PPXY |UV . For any system PXY |UV , consider the
distribution PXY UV = PXY |UV /|U||V|. Then a system PXY |UV is in Pηcond if PXY UV ∈ Pη and
PXY |UV is in P−ηcond if PXY UV ∈ P−η .
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Let us motivate, why we take exactly this definition of Pηcond: the reason is, that it is useful to
estimate P TXY |UV λ, where P
T
XY |UV is the vector of all probabilities in the conditional distribution
and λ is some vector. This is in fact exactly the form of the bound on the guessing probability.
Lemma 13. Let P = PXY |UV . For all P η¯XY |UV /∈ P
η
cond, it holds that
P η¯XY |UV
T · λ− P TXY |UV · λ ≤ PXY |UV T · λ+ |U||V| · η ·
(∑
i
|λi|
)
.
Proof. (
P η¯XY |UV
T − P TXY |UV
)
· λ = |U||V| · P η¯XY UV
T
λ− |U||V| · PXY UV T · λ
= |U||V| ·
(
P ηXY UV
T − PXY UV T
)
· λ
≤ |U||V| · η ·
(∑
i
|λi|
)
.
We will need the Sampling Lemma (Lemma 14) to show that our protocol is secure, i.e., it
ǫ-securely filters input states with P˜guess ≥ Pguess + |U||V| · η ·
∑
i |λi| for the individual systems.
Lemma 14. Sampling Lemma [KR05] Let Z be an n-tuple and Z ′ a k-tuple of random variables
over a set Z, with symmetric joint probability PZZ′. Let Qz′ be the relative frequency distribution
of a fixed sequence z′ and Q(z,z′) be the relative frequency distribution of a sequence (z, z
′), drawn
according to PZZ′. Then for every ε ≥ 0 we have
PZZ′ [||Q(z,z′) −Qz′ || ≥ ε] ≤ |Z| · e−kε
2/8|Z|
Lemma 15. Protocol 1 ǫ-securely filters
(
P+ηcond
)⊗n
with
ǫ = |X ||Y||U||V| · e−
(
t′η2
8|X||Y|
)
,
where t′ = k2pn/|U||V|.
Proof. If for each of the conditional distributions PXY |U=u,V=v the estimate is within η, this also
holds for the total distribution PXY UV . By Lemma 14, the probability that for any conditional
distribution the estimate is η-far is at most |X ||Y|e−t′η2/8|X ||Y|, where t′ = k2pn/|U||V|. We obtain
the lemma by the union bound over all inputs.
Note that ǫ ∈ O(2−n) for any constant 0 < k, p < 1 and η > 0.
Lemma 16. Protocol 1 is ǫ′ robust on (P−η)⊗n with
ǫ′ = |X ||Y||U||V| · e−
(
t′η2
8|X||Y|
)
+ e−2n((1−p)(1−k)
2)
2
+ |U||V| · e−2n
(
(1−p)k2
|U||V|
)2
,
where t′ = k2pn/|U||V|.
Proof. This follows by the same argument as Lemma 15 and a Chernoff bound (i.e., Pr[ 1n
∑
i xi ≤
p− ε] ≤ e−2nε2) on the probability that the protocol aborts because any of the inputs did not occur
often enough.
It holds that ǫ′ ∈ O(2−n) for any constant 0 < k, p < 1 and η > 0.
Lemma 17. The protocol ǫ-securely filters systems with P˜guess ≥ Pguess+η′ for the individual system,
where η′ = |U||V| · η ·∑i |λi|.
15
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 15 and Lemma 13 and the fact that the guessing
probability is given by P TXY |UV λ, see (4).
Lemma 18. The protocol ǫ-securely filters systems with δ˜ ≥ δ + η′ for the individual systems.
Proof. This follows from the definition of P+ηcond.
Lemma 19. Assume the parameter estimation protocol ǫ-securely filters inputs such that
P˜guess ≥ Pguess+ η′ for the individual systems. Then it ǫ-securely filters systems with Hmin(X|E)ρ ≤
−n log2 P˜guess.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2 and the product lemma for the guessing probability (Lemma 12).
6.2 Information reconciliation
Having estimated the probability of error δ of their key bits in the previous section, Alice and Bob
can do information reconciliation by applying a two-universal hash function4 with output length m
bits, where m = n · h(δ) + ε and they can almost surely correct their errors, i.e., the keys will be
equal apart from with exponentially small probability.
Definition 14. Let P be a set of distributions PXY . An information reconciliation protocol is
ǫ-correct on P, if on input PXY ∈ P it outputs x′, y′ such that x′ 6= y′ with probability at most ǫ.
It is ǫ′-robust on P, if on input PXY ∈ P it aborts with probability at most ǫ′.
Protocol 2 (Information reconciliation).
1. Alice obtains x and Bob y distributed according to P⊗nXY with X = Y = {0, 1} and P (X 6=
Y ) ≤ δ. Alice outputs x′ = x.
2. Alice chooses a function f ∈ F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m at random, where F is a two-universal set
of functions.
3. She sends the function f and f(x) to Bob.
4. Bob chooses y′ such that dH(y,y
′) is minimal among all strings z with f(z) = f(x) (if there
are two possibilities, he chooses one at random) and outputs y′.
The following theorem by Brassard and Salvail states that information reconciliation can be
achieved by a two-universal function. We state the theorem with s slightly stronger bound on the
error probability than the one originally given in [BS93].
Theorem 5 (Information reconciliation [BS93]). Let x be an n-bit string and y another n-bit string
obtained by sending x over a binary symmetric channel with error parameter δ. Assume the function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is chosen at random amongst a set of two-universal functions. Choose y′ such
that dH(y,y
′) is minimal among all strings r with f(r) = f(x). Then, for any κ > 0,
Pr[x 6= y′] ≤ e−2κ2·n + 2n·h(δ+κ)−m ,
where h(p) = −p · log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p) is the binary entropy function.
4Information reconciliation using a two-universal hash function has the disadvantage, that the decoding procedure
(i.e., for Bob to find y′) cannot be done in a computationally efficient way, in general. It is possible to use a code
for information reconciliation instead and there exist codes which can be efficiently decoded [Hol06]. However, in our
setup the theoretical efficiency of the decoding procedure is actually not important, as there exist codes with very
good decoding properties in practice and Alice and Bob can test whether they have correctly decoded using a short
hash value of their strings. In case decoding does not succeed, they can repeat the protocol, resulting in some loss of
robustness.
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Proof. x 6= y′ if either dH(x,y) is large or if f(x) = f(y′). The probability that the strings x and
y differ at more than n(δ + κ) positions is bounded by
Pr[dH(x,y)] ≥ n · (δ + κ)] ≤ e−2κ2·n .
The probability a y′ 6= x with small dH(x,y′) is mapped to the same value by f is
Pr[f(x) = f(y′), dH(x,y
′) ≤ n(δ + κ)] ≤ 2−m ·
n(δ+κ)∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
≤ 2−m2n·h(δ+κ) .
The theorem follows by the union bound.
Lemma 20. The protocol is ǫ-correct on input P⊗nXY such that P (X 6= Y ) ≤ δ where, for any κ > 0,
ǫ = e−2κ
2·n + 2n·h(δ+κ)−m .
and 0-robust on all inputs.
Proof. Correctness follows directly from Theorem 5. Robustness follows from the fact that there
always exists a y′ such that f(y′) = f(x).
For any κ > 0 and m > n · h(δ + κ), this value is ∈ O(2−n).
When some information about the raw key is released — such as, for example, when Alice and
Bob do information reconciliation — the min-entropy can at most be reduced by the number of bits
communicated, see [Ren05].
Theorem 6 (Chain rule [Ren05]). Let ρXEC be classical on C. Then
Hmin(X|E,C)ρ ≥ Hmin(X|E)ρ −Hmax(C) ≥ Hmin(X|E)ρ −m ,
where m = log2 |C| is the number of bits of C.
6.3 Privacy amplification
In order to create a highly secure key from a partially secure string, Alice and Bob will do privacy
amplification i.e., apply a two-universal hash function to their raw keys. The distance from uniform
of the final key string is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 7 (Privacy amplification [RK05, Ren05]). Let ρXE be classical on HX and let F be a
family of two-universal hash functions from |X | to {0, 1}s. Then
d(ρF (X)EF |EF ) ≤
√
tr ρXE · 2−
1
2
(Hmin(ρXE |E)−s) ≤ 2− 12 (Hmin(ρXE |E)−s) .
6.4 Key distribution
We can now put everything together to obtain a key-distribution scheme. A key-distribution protocol
should be secure. This means that it should output the same key to Alice and Bob (correctness) and
Eve should not know anything about the key (secrecy). Furthermore, the protocol should output a
key when the adversary is passive, i.e., it should be robust.
Protocol 3 (Key distribution).
1. Alice and Bob receive P⊗n
XY |UV
2. They apply parameter estimation using Protocol 1.
3. They do information reconciliation using Protocol 2.
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4. Privacy amplification: Alice chooses a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}s ∈ F from a two-universal
set and sends f to Bob. Alice outputs f(x) and Bob f(y′).
Lemma 21. Protocol 3 is ǫ-secret with ǫ ∈ O(2−n) and ǫ′-correct with ǫ′ ∈ O(2−n) for m > n · h(δ)
and s = q · n < log2 Pguess −m/n. It is ǫ′′-robust on (P−η)⊗n with ǫ′′ ∈ O(2−n).
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the fact that each step in the protocol is secure (Lemma 15,
Lemma 20 and Theorem 7), taking into account Theorem 6. Robustness follows from the robustness
of the parameter-estimation protocol, Lemma 16.
The secret key rate is the length of the key S that the protocol can output and still remain
secure. We obtain the following.
Lemma 22. The scheme reaches a key rate q of
q = − log2 Pguess − h(δ)
Lemma 23. The scheme reaches a positive key rate q whenever
− log2 Pguess − h(δ) > 0
7 Removing the Assumption of Independence
We have seen that Alice and Bob can do key agreement (i.e., they either agree on a secret key or
abort) if they share i.i.d. distributions. We now want to remove the requirement of independence.
A special case is the one where Alice and Bob have two inputs and two outputs, i.e., their system
violated the CHSH inequality [CHSH69]. In this case, there exists a (classical) map which they can
apply to their inputs and outputs such that the system afterwards actually is i.i.d. more precisely
a convex combination of i.i.d. distributions [MAG06, MRW+09]. The systems obtained this way,
furthermore still violate the CHSH inequality by the same amount.5
In general, we do not know of such a map to transform arbitrary systems into product systems.
Nevertheless, we will be able to relate the security of the key-distribution scheme on any input to the
security of the scheme on product inputs PXY |UV = P
⊗n
XY |UV , for which we have already seen that
it is secure, in Section 6. The reason is that we know that security is ‘permutation invariant’ under
the systems because each step of the protocol — parameter estimation, information reconciliation
and privacy amplification — is permutation invariant6. The post-selection theorem allows us to
relate security of permutation invariant states to the security of product states.
The post-selection theorem tells us that any permutation-invariant state can be obtained from the
convex combination of i.i.d. (product) states by a measurement, and furthermore this measurement
‘works’ sufficiently often. Therefore, if our key-distribution scheme is secure for product distributions,
it is still ‘almost as secure’ on a permutation invariant one.
Technically, the post-selection technique [CKR09] gives a bound on the diamond norm between
two completely positive trace-preserving maps (i.e., quantum channels) acting symmetrically on an
n-party system. The diamond norm is directly related to the maximal probability of guessing
whether one or the other map has been applied (on an input of choice), through the formula p =
1/2+1/4‖E −F‖⋄ (i.e., the distinguishing advantage is then 1/4‖E −F‖⋄.) Therefore, it is especially
useful in the context of cryptography, where usually a real map is compared to an ideal map — such
as one that creates a key that is secure by construction. While the diamond norm is defined as a
maximization over all possible input states, the post-selection technique tells us that in the case of
permutation invariant maps it is enough to consider them acting on a de Finetti state, i.e., a convex
combination of product states τHn =
∫
σ⊗nH µ(σH), where µ is the measure induced by the Hilbert
Schmidt metric. Let us now restate the main result of [CKR09].
5A similar map also exists for the generalization of the CHSH inequality, the Braunstein-Caves inequalities [BC90].
6Otherwise permutation-invariance could be enforced by applying a random permutation on the systems at the
beginning.
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Theorem 8 (Post-selection [CKR09]). Consider a linear map from End(H⊗n) to End(H′).7 If for
any permutation π there exists a CPTP map Kπ such that ∆ ◦ π = Kπ ◦∆, then
‖∆‖⋄ ≤ gn,d‖(∆⊗ 1R)τHnR‖1 ,
where 1R denotes the identity map on End(R) and gn,d =
(n+d2−1
n
) ≤ (n+1)d2−1, where d = dimH.
For our purposes, this means roughly
Pr[E(σπ) = insecure] ≤ (n + 1)(d2−1)
∫
Pr[E(σ⊗n) = insecure]dσ ,
where σπ is a permutation invariant input and E denotes the event that the scheme is insecure.
The very right-hand side is what we have analysed in the previous section and because this is
exponentially small, it remains exponentially small even when multiplied by the polynomial factor
in front of it.
In our case, σ represents the system PXY |UV . We, therefore, need to model PXY |UV by a quantum
state (note that this is only a mathematical tool and does not have any physical meaning). More
precisely, we represent the distribution PXY UV by σ. Since our parameter estimation protocol is
such that it filters the conditional distribution independently of the input distribution (it aborts if
any input does not occur often enough), this is equivalent.
Lemma 24. Let PXY UV be a probability distribution. Then there exists a density matrix σ in a
Hilbert space H with dim(H)) = |X ||Y||U||V| such that measuring σ in the standard basis gives the
distribution PXY UV .
Proof. Associate with each element of the standard basis {|i〉}i an outcome x, y, u, v. Take σ =∑|X ||Y||U||V|
i=1 pi |i〉 〈i| where pi = PXY UV (x, y, u, v).
This tells us, that we can use d = |X ||Y||U||V| in the above formula. Let us now state, that
the key-distribution protocol is secure on any input (not only product). It furthermore reaches
essentially the same key rate. Robustness remains, of course, unchanged.
Theorem 9. Protocol 3 is ǫ-secure with ǫ ∈ O(2−n) on any input for m > n · h(δ) and s = q · n <
log2 Pguess −m/n. It is ǫ′′-robust on (P−η)⊗n with ǫ′′ ∈ O(2−n).
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 21, using Theorem 8.
8 A Specific Protocol
While our results apply to a rather generic class of protocols (see Protocol 3), we consider here,
for the purpose of illustration, a specific protocol, as described below (Protocol 4). The protocol
is an entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol similar to the original proposal by
Ekert [Eke91].
Protocol 4.
1. Alice creates n maximally entangled states |Ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/√2, and sends one qubit of
every state to Bob.
2. Alice and Bob randomly measure the ith system in either the basis U0 or U1 (for Alice) or V0,
V1 or V2 (Bob); the five bases are shown in Figure 4. Bob flips his measurement result. They
make sure that measurements associated with different subsystems commute.
3. The measurement results when both measured U0, V2 form the raw key.
4. For the remaining k measurements they announce the results over the public authenticated
channel and estimate the guessing probability and δ (see Section 6.1). If the parameters are
such that key agreement is possible, they continue; otherwise they abort.
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Figure 4: Alice’s and Bob’s measurement bases in terms of polarization used in Protocol 4.
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Figure 5: The key rate of Protocol 4 secure against device-independent quantum adversaries as
function of the channel noise.
5. They do information reconciliation and privacy amplification as given in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.
Our main results (in particular Theorem 9) allow us to calculate the rate at which the protocol
can produce a secure key, depending on the quality of the original entangled states shared by Alice
and Bob. (This quality normally depends on the noise in the quantum channel used to distribute
the entangled states.) For the matter of concreteness, we assume that these shared entangled states
are mixtures consisting of a singlet (with weight 1− ρ) and a fully mixed state (with weight ρ). The
resulting rate depending on the parameter ρ is shown in Figure 5.
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A The XOR as Privacy-Amplification Function
A.1 Best attack on a bit
Of course, the analysis of Section 4 also tells us the best attack in case the function f maps X to a
bit. However, we can give a slightly different form to calculate the distance from uniform of a bit.
This will allow us to show an XOR-Lemma for quantum secrecy.
Lemma 25. Let PXZ|UW be a quantum system. The distance from uniform of B = f(X) given
Z(W ) and Q := (U = u, F = f) is bounded by
d(B|Z(W ), Q) ≤ 1
2
· bT · Γ∗∆ ,
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where bT · Γ∗∆ is the optimal value of the optimization problem
max :
∑
x:B=0
Γ∆(x,u)−
∑
x:B=1
Γ∆(x,u) (7)
s. t. : AqbΓ∆ = 0
Γ∆  Γkmarg
Γ∆  −Γkmarg ,
where Γkmarg is the matrix associated with the marginal system PX|U .
Proof. Define
Γ∆ = 2p · Γz0 − Γmarg .
and note that with this definition Γz0 = (Γmarg + Γ∆)/(2p) and Γ
z1 = (Γmarg − Γ∆)/(2(1 − p)).
The distance from uniform of a bit can be expressed as
d(B|Z(W ), Q) = 1
2
·
[
p ·
( ∑
x:B=0
Γz0(x,u)−
∑
x:B=1
Γz0(x,u)
)
+(1− p) ·
( ∑
x:B=1
Γz1(x,u)−
∑
x:B=0
Γz1(x,u)
)]
=
1
2
· bT · Γ∗∆ .
Now notice that Γz0 and Γz1 are actually quantum certificates of order k exactly if Γ∆ fulfils the
above requirements. The conditions given by Aqb the matrix Γ needs to fulfil are all linear and,
therefore, because Γkmarg fulfils them, Γ
z0 and Γz1 fulfil them exactly if Γ∆ does. The semi-definite
constraints correspond exactly to the requirement that Γz0 and Γz0 are positive semi-definite, using
the fact that the space of positive semi-definite matrices forms a convex cone.
The above semi-definite program can be written in the following form:
PRIMAL
max : bT · Γ∆ (8)
s. t. :

 1−1
Aqb


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
·Γ∆


=
Γkmarg
Γkmarg
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
DUAL
min : (Γkmarg)
T (λ1 + λ2) (9)
s. t. :
(
1 −1 ATqb
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
AT
·

 λ1λ2
λ3

 = b
λ1, λ2  0, λ3 unrestricted
A.2 Best attack on a bit in terms of observable probabilities
Any dual solution of (9) gives us a bound on the distance from uniform of the bit B in terms of the
matrix elements Γkmarg. We will now change our primal program to one where we optimize over all
Γkmarg compatible with the observable probabilities. The dual of this program has a solution only
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in terms these probabilities. We then show how we can transform any dual feasible solution of this
program into a dual feasible solution of the program above with the same value.
The new semi-definite program we consider is the following:
PRIMAL
max : bT · Γ∆ (10)
s. t. :


1 −1
−1 −1
Aqb 0
0 AIJ
0 Aqb

 ·
(
Γ∆
Γkmarg
) 
=
=
=
0
0
0
PX|U
0
Γ∆,Γ
k
marg unrestricted
DUAL
min : P T
X|U · λ4 (11)
s. t. :
(
1 −1 ATqb 0 0
−1 −1 0 AIJ Aqb
)
·


λ1
λ2
λ3
λ4
λ5

 =
(
b
0
)
λ1, λ2  0, λ3, λ4, λ5 unrestricted
where the matrix AIJ is such that AIJ · Γkmarg = PX|U . We claim that any dual feasible solution
of (11) can be transformed into a dual feasible solution of (9) with the same objective value. The
solution of (11) therefore gives a bound on the distance from uniform only in terms of the observable
probabilities.
Lemma 26. Assume λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5 is a dual feasible solution of (11). Then λ1, λ2, λ3 is a dual
feasible solutions of (9) reaching the same objective value.
Proof. The condition that λ1, λ2, λ3 is feasible for (9) follows directly from the (upper row) feasibility
condition of (11). To see that it reaches the same value, we use that fact that Γkmarg is a quantum
certificate, i.e.,
Aqb · Γkmarg = 0
and the (lower row) condition of (11), i.e.,
− λ1 − λ2 +ATIJ · λ4 +ATqb · λ5 = 0 .
We then obtain
Γk
T
marg · (λ1 + λ2) = Γk
T
marg · (λ1 + λ2) + ΓTmarg · (−λ1 − λ2 +ATIJ · λ4 +ATqb · λ5)
= Γk
T
marg · (ATIJ · λ4 +ATqb · λ5)
= (AIJ · Γkmarg)Tλ4
= P T
X|U · λ4 .
A.3 An XOR-Lemma for quantum secrecy
Using Lemma 10, we can now show that the XOR of the two partially secure bits is highly secure.
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Lemma 27. Let A1, b1, c1 be the parameters associated with the semi-definite program (8) bounding
the distance from uniform of a bit f(X1) ∈ {0, 1} obtained from an n-party quantum system PX1|U1
where Q = (U1 = u1, F = f) Similarly associate A2, b2, c2 with the distance from uniform of a
bit g(X2) ∈ {0, 1} obtained from an m-party quantum system PX2|U2 . Then then the distance
from uniform of the bit f(X1)⊕ g(X2) obtained from the (n+m)-party system PX1X2|U1U2 , where
Q = (U1 = u1,U2 = u2, F = f,G = g) is bounded by the semi-definite program A, b, c with
A = A1 ⊗A2 and b = b1 ⊗ b2.
Proof. This follows form the fact that any (n+m)-party quantum system must fulfil Lemma 10 and
b describing the XOR of two bits can be described as the tensor product of the ones associated with
each of the two bits.
This implies that for any dual feasible solution, the tensor product is dual feasible for the tensor
product problem.
Lemma 28. Let λ1 be a dual feasible for (9) with A1, b1, c1 associated with an n-party quantum
system and λ2 dual feasible for an m-party quantum system described by A2, b2, c2. Then λ = λ1⊗λ2
is dual feasible for A, b, c where A = A1 ⊗A2 and b = b1 ⊗ b2.
Proof. λ1 ⊗ λ2 fulfils the dual constraints because
[A1 ⊗A2](λ1 ⊗ λ2) = b1 ⊗ b2 .
Furthermore, the tensor product of two positive semi-definite matrices is again positive semi-definite.
We can now formulate the XOR-Lemma for quantum secrecy.
Theorem 10 (XOR-Lemma for quantum secrecy). Let PX1|U1 be an n-party quantum system and
f(X1) a bit such that d(f(X1)|Z(W ), Q) ≤ (P TX1|U1λ1)/2 with Q = (U1 = u1, F = f). Similarly,
associate d(g(X2)|Z(W ), Q) ≤ (P TX2|U2λ2)/2 with a bit from an m-party quantum system PX2|U2
where Q = (U2 = u2, G = g). Then the distance from uniform of f(X1)⊕ g(X2) obtained from the
(n +m)-party quantum system PX1X2|U1U2 with Q = (U1 = u1,U2 = u2, F = f,G = g) is bounded
by
d(f(X1)⊕ g(X2)|Z(W ), Q) ≤ 1
2
P T
X1X2|U1U2
(λ1 ⊗ λ2) .
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 28.
When the marginal system is of the form PX1|U1 ⊗ PX2|U2 , this implies that the XOR is secure,
whenever one of the two bits is secure.
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